The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol and non-abelian nilpotent
  groups by Mahalanobis, Ayan
ar
X
iv
:m
at
h/
06
02
28
2v
3 
 [m
ath
.G
R]
  1
8 O
ct 
20
07
March 5, 2018
THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
AND NON-ABELIAN NILPOTENT GROUPS
AYAN MAHALANOBIS
Abstract. In this paper we study a key exchange protocol similar to
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, using abelian subgroups of
the automorphism group of a non-abelian nilpotent group. We also
generalize group no.92 of the Hall-Senior table [16] to an arbitrary prime
p and show that, for those groups, the group of central automorphisms
is commutative. We use these for the key exchange we are studying.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we generalize the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol from
a cyclic group to a finitely presented non-abelian nilpotent group of class 2.
Similar efforts were made in [2, 3, 25] to use braid groups, a family of finitely
presented non-commutative groups [4, 10], in key exchange. We also refer
to [40, Section 3] for a formal description of a key exchange protocol similar
to ours1. Our efforts are not solely directed to construct an efficient and
fast key exchange protocol. We also try to understand the conjecture, the
discrete logarithm problem is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem in a
cyclic group. We develop and study protocols where, at least theoretically,
non-abelian groups can be used to share a secret or exchange private keys
between two people over an insecure channel. This development is significant
because nilpotent or, more specifically, p-groups have nice presentations and
computation in those groups is fast and easy [41, Chapter 9]. So our work
can be seen as a nice application of the advanced and developed subject of
p-groups and computation with p-groups.
The frequently used public key cryptosystems are slow and use mainly
number theoretic complexity. The specific cryptographic primitive that we
have in mind is the discrete logarithm problem, DLP for short. DLP is gen-
eral enough to be defined in an arbitrary cyclic group as follows: let G = 〈g〉
be a cyclic group generated by g and let gn = h, where n ∈ N. Given g and
h, DLP is to find n [42, Chapter 6]. The security of the discrete logarithm
1The author expresses his gratitude to the referee for this reference.
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problem depends on the representation of the group. It is trivial in Zn, but
is much harder (no polynomial time algorithm known) in the multiplicative
group of a finite field and even harder (no sub-exponential time algorithm
known) in the group of elliptic curves which are not supersingular [5]. But
with the invention of sub-exponential algorithms for breaking the discrete
logarithm problem, like the index calculus and Coppersmith’s algorithm,
multiplicative groups of finite fields are no longer that attractive especially
the ones of characteristic 2.
The discrete logarithm problem can be used in many other groups like
the group of elliptic curves, in which case a cyclic group or a big enough
cyclic component of an abelian group is used. In this article we propose a
generalization of DLP or more specifically the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol in situations where the group has more than one generator, i.e.,
in a finitely presented non-abelian group. Let f be an automorphism of a
finitely presented group G generated by {a1, a2, . . . , an}. If one knows the
action of f on a ∈ G, i.e., f(a), then it is difficult for him to tell the action
of f on any other b ∈ G i.e., f(b). We describe this in detail later under
the name “the general discrete logarithm problem”. In this paper we work
with finitely presented groups in terms of generators and relations and do
not consider any representation of that group. Though that seems to be a
good idea for future research.
Now suppose for a moment that G = 〈g〉 is a cyclic group and that we
are given g and gn where gcd(n, |G|) = 1. DLP is to find n. Notice that in
this case the map x 7→ xn is an automorphism. If we conjecture that finding
the automorphism is finding n then one way to see DLP, in terms of group
theory, is to find the automorphism from its image on one element. This is
the central idea that we want to generalize to non-abelian finitely presented
groups, especially to a family of p-groups of class 2. This explains our choice
of the name the general discrete logarithm problem.
To work with a finitely presented group and its automorphisms the fol-
lowing properties of the group are needed.
• A consistent and natural representation of the elements in the group.
• Computation in the group should be fast and easy.
• The automorphism group should be known and the automorphisms
should have a nice enough presentation so that images can be com-
puted quickly.
We note at this point that for a p-group the first two requirements are
satisfied [41, Chapter 9].
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2. Our Contribution in this article
The central idea behind this article is to study a generalization of the
discrete logarithm problem (DLP) that we call the general discrete logarithm
problem (GDLP). As a cryptographic primitive the concept of GDLP seems
to be secure (see Section 4.1).
To use GDLP we use a Diffie-Hellman like key exchange protocol using
finitely presented p-groups with an abelian central automorphism group.
In this case the security depends not only on GDLP but also on GDHP
(see Section 4.2) which turns out to be insecure in the specific case we are
studying.
Section 8 of this paper contains a brief survey of all the group theoretic
results necessary for a reader to understand the later part of this paper.
However, a knowledgeable reader might choose to ignore Section 8 altogether
and come back to it when required. In Section 10 we survey the existing
literature for groups with abelian automorphism group and show that none
of them are adequate for the key exchange we are studying.
We found no groups readily available in the literature, hence we had to
develop a family of groups Gn(m, p) with abelian central automorphism
group (Section 10). This is a significant contribution to the theory of finite
groups because Gn(m, p) is a generalization of group no. 92 of the Hall-
Senior table. We describe the group of automorphisms for this group and
further prove that this group is Miller if and only if p = 2.
We do not claim that the key exchange protocol is secure. Rather, we
show that the key exchange protocol is insecure for the particular family of
groups that we picked. Our study raises two important questions which are
of interest both mathematically as well as cryptographically.
a: Are there groups different from Gn(m, p), with an abelian central
automorphism group, for which the key exchange protocol is secure?
b: Does there exist any cryptographic protocol with reductionist secu-
rity proof, where the security of the protocol depends only on the
discrete logarithm problem? If one can find such a protocol using
cyclic groups then that could be generalized using GDLP, and since
we claim that GDLP is a secure primitive, this will give rise to a
secure cryptosystem using non-abelian groups.
3. Some notations and Definitions
We now describe some of the definitions and notations that will be used
in this paper. The notations used are standard:
• G will denote a finite group. Z = Z(G) denotes the center of the
group G and will be denoted by Z if no confusion can arise.
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• G′ = [G,G] is the commutator subgroup of G.
• Aut(G) and Autc(G) are the group of automorphisms and the group
of central automorphisms of G, respectively.
• Φ(G) is the Frattini subgroup of G, which is the intersection of all
maximal subgroups of G.
• We denote the commutator of a, b by [a, b] where [a, b] = a−1b−1ab.
• The exponent of a p-group G, denoted by exp(G), is the largest
power of p that is the order of an element in G.
The following commutator formulas hold for any element a,b and c in any
group G.
(a): ab = a[a, b]
(b): [ab, c] = [a, c]b[b, c] = [a, c][a, c, b][b, c] it follows that in a nilpotent
group of class 2, [ab, c] = [a, c][b, c]
(c): [a, bc] = [a, c][a, b]c = [a, c][a, b][a, b, c] it follows that in a nilpotent
group of class 2, [a, bc] = [a, b][a, c]
(d): [a, b]−1 = [b, a]
The proof of these formulas follow from direct computation or can be found
in [23].
Definition (Miller Group). A group G is called a Miller group if it has an
abelian automorphism group, in other words, if Aut(G) is commutative then
the group G is Miller.
Definition (Central Automorphisms). Let G be a group, then φ ∈ Aut(G) is
called a central automorphism if g−1φ(g) ∈ Z(G) for all g ∈ G. Alternately,
one might say that φ is a central automorphism if φ(g) = gzφ,g where zφ,g ∈
Z(G) depends on g and φ. If φ is clear from the context then we can simplify
the notation as φ(g) = gzg.
Apart from inner automorphisms, central automorphisms are second best
in terms of nice description. They are very attractive for cryptographic
purposes, since it is easy to describe the automorphisms and compute the
image of an arbitrary element.
Theorem 3.1. The centralizer of the group of inner automorphisms is the
group of central automorphisms. Moreover a central automorphism fixes the
commutator elementwise.
This theorem first appears in [13] which refers to [17] and [46].
Definition (Polycyclic Group). Let G be a group, a finite series of subgroups
in G
G = G0 D G1 D G2 D G3 D . . . D Gn = 1
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is a polycyclic series if Gi/Gi+1 is cyclic and Gi+1 is a normal subgroup of
Gi. Any group with polycyclic series is a polycyclic group.
It is easy to prove that finitely generated nilpotent groups are polycyclic,
hence any finitely generated p-group is polycyclic. Let ai be an element in Gi
whose image generates Gi/Gi+1. Then the sequence {a1, a2, . . . , an} is called
a polycyclic generating set. It is easy to see that g ∈ G can be written as g =
aα11 a
α2
2 . . . a
αn
n , where αi are integers. If g = a
α1
1 a
α2
2 . . . a
αn
n where 0 ≤ αi <
mi, mi = |Gi : Gi+1| then the expression is a collected word. Each element
g ∈ G can be expressed by a unique collected word. Computation with these
collected words is easy and implementable in computer, for more information
on this topic see [41, Section 9.4] and also [15, polycyclic package].
4. Key Exchange
We want to follow the Diffie-Hellman Key exchange protocol using a com-
mutative subgroup of the automorphism group of a finitely presented group
G. The security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in a cyclic
group rests on the following three factors:
DLP: The discrete logarithm problem.
DHP: The Diffie-Hellman problem.
DDH: The decision Diffie-Hellman problem [6, 7, 14, 39, 44].
We have already described the discrete logarithm problem. The Diffie-
Hellman problem is the following: let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of order
n. One knows g, ga and gb, and the problem is to compute gab. It is not
known if DLP is equivalent to DHP. The decision Diffie-Hellman problem
is more subtle. Suppose that DHP is a hard problem, so it is impossible to
compute gab from ga, gb and g. But what happens if someone can compute
or predict 80% of the binary bits of gab from ga, gb and g, then the adversary
will have 80% of the shared secret or the private key; that is most of the
private key. This is clearly unacceptable. It is often hard to formalize DDH
in exact mathematical terms ([7, Section 3]); the best formalism offered is a
randomness criterion for the bits of the key. In DDH we ask the question,
given the triple ga, gb and gc is c = ab mod n? But there is no known link
between DDH and any mathematically hard problem for the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol in cyclic groups.
Clearly, solving the discrete logarithm problem solves the Diffie-Hellman
problem and solving the Diffie-Hellman problem solves the decision Diffie-
Hellman problem.
As is usual, we denote by Alice and Bob, two people trying to set up a
private key over an insecure channel to communicate securely and Oscar an
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eavesdropping adversary. In this paper the shared secret or the private key
is an element of a finitely presented group G.
4.1. General Discrete Logarithm Problem. Let G = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉
and f : G → G be a non-identity automorphism. Suppose one knows f(a)
and a ∈ G then GDLP is to find f(b) for any b in G. Assuming the word
problem is easy or presentation of the group is by means of generators, GDLP
is equivalent to finding f(ai) for all i which in terms gives us a complete
knowledge of the automorphism. So in other words the cryptographic prim-
itive GDLP is equivalent to, “finding the automorphism f from the action
of f on only one element”.
4.2. General Diffie-Hellman Problem. Let φ,ψ : G → G be arbitrary
automorphisms such that φψ = ψφ, and assume one knows a, φ(a) and ψ(a).
Then GDHP is to find φ(ψ(a)). Notice that GDHP is a restricted form of
GDLP, because in case of GDHP one has to compute φ(ψ(a)) for some fixed
a, not φ(b) for an arbitrary b in G. There is an interesting GDHP attack
due to Vladimir Shpilrain. To mount this attack one need not find φ but
finds another automorphism φ′ such that φ′ψ = ψφ′ and φ′(a) = φ(a). Since
φ(ψ(a)) = ψ(φ′(a)) = φ′(ψ(a)), the knowledge of the φ′ breaks the system.
We will refer to this attack as the Shpilrain’s attack.
We now describe two key exchange protocols and do some cryptanalysis.
We denote by G a finitely presented group and S an abelian subgroup of
Aut(G).
5. Key Exchange Protocol I
Alice and Bob want to set up a private key. They select a group G and
an element a ∈ G \ Z(G) over an insecure channel. Then Alice picks a
random automorphism φA ∈ S and sends Bob φA(a). Bob similarly picks
a random automorphism φB ∈ S and sends Alice φB(a). Both of them
can now compute φA(φB(a)) = φB(φA(a)) which is their private key for a
symmetric transmission.
Step 1: Alice and Bob selects the groupG and an element a ∈ G\Z(G)
in public. Notice that G and a are public information.
Step 2: Alice and Bob picks, at random, two automorphisms φA and
φB from S respectively. Notice that φA and φB are private informa-
tion.
Step 3: Alice and Bob compute φA(a) and φB(a) respectively and ex-
changes them. Notice that φA(a) and φB(a) are public information.
Step 4: Both of them compute φA (φB(a)) = φB (φA(a)) from their
private information; which is their private key.
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5.1. Comments on Key Exchange Protocol I. Though initially it might
seem that we do not have enough information to know the automorphisms
φA and φB, it turns out that if we are using automorphisms which fix con-
jugacy classes, like inner automorphisms, then the security of the above
scheme actually rests on the conjugacy problem.
Let φA(a) = x
−1ax and φB(a) = y
−1ay for some x and y. Then φA(φB(a))
= (yx)−1a(yx). Since a, φA(a) and φB(a) are known, if the conjugacy
problem is easy in the group then anyone can find x and y and break the
system.
In the above scheme Oscar knows G and a. If the automorphisms are
central automorphisms, then he also sees φA(a) = azφA,a and φB(a) =
azφB ,a. Oscar can compute zφA,a and zφB ,a. Now if G is a special p-group
(G′ = Z(G) = Φ(G)) then Z(G) is fixed elementwise by both φA and φB .
Then
φA(φB(a)) = φA(azφB ,a) = azφA,azφB ,a. (1)
Oscar knows a and can compute zφA,a and zφB,a and can find the private
key φA(φB(a)). In the literature all examples of Miller p-group with odd
prime p are special and the above key exchange is fatally flawed for those
groups.
6. Key Exchange Protocol II
In this case Alice and Bob want to set up a private key and they set up
a group G over an insecure channel. Alice chooses a random non-central
element g and a random automorphism φA ∈ S and sends Bob φA(g). Bob
picks another automorphism φB ∈ S and computes φB(φA(g)) and sends
it back to Alice. Alice, knowing φA, computes φ
−1
A which gives her φB(g)
and picks another random automorphism φH ∈ S and computes φH(φB(g))
and sends it back to Bob. Bob, knowing φB computes φ
−1
B which gives him
φH(g) which is their private key. Notice that Alice never reveals g in public.
Step 1: Alice and Bob set up the group G. Notice that G is public
information.
Step 2: Alice picks g ∈ G \ Z(G) and a random φA ∈ S. Then she
computes φA(g) and sends that to Bob. Notice that g and φA are
private but φA(g) is public.
Step 3: Bob picks φB ∈ S at random and computes φB (φA(g)) and
sends that back to Alice. Notice that φB is private but φB (φA(g))
is public.
Step 4: Alice computes φ−1A and then computing φ
−1
A (φB (φA(g))) she
gets φB(g).
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Step 5: Alice now picks another random automorphism φH ∈ S and
computes φH (φB(g)) and φH(g). She then sends φH (φB(g)) to Bob
but keeps φH(g) private.
Step 6: Similar to Step 4, Bob computes φH(g). Now both Alice and
Bob knows φH(g) and it is their common key.
6.1. Comments on Key Exchange Protocol II. Notice that for central
automorphisms, φA and φB, φA(g) = gzφA,g; since g is not known Oscar
doesn’t know zφA,g but if G is special (Z(G) = G
′ = Φ(G)) then φB(gzφA,g)
= gzφB ,gzφA,g from which zφB ,g can be computed. Now φH(φB(g)) =
gzφB ,gzφH ,g is a public information; so using zφB ,g one can compute gzφH ,g,
which is φH(g) and the scheme is broken. As one clearly sees, this attack is
not possible if the group is not special.
The reader might have noticed at this point that all the attacks are GDHP.
So certainly in some groups GDHP is easy, even though GDLP is hard.
As we know, any automorphism in G can be seen as a restriction of
an inner automorphism in Hol(G) (see [29, 45] for further details on the
holomorph of a group). Solving the conjugacy problem in Hol(G) will break
the key exchange protocols for any automorphism. On the other hand,
operation in Hol(G) is twisted so it is possible that the conjugacy problem
in Hol(G) is difficult even though it is easy in G. Since any cyclic group is
a Miller group, success of the holomorph attack would prove insecurity in
DLP. Therefore we believe that the holomorph attack will not be successful
in many cases. Though more work needs to be done on this.
7. Key Exchange using Braid Groups
In [25] a similar key exchange protocol was defined, in this section we
mention some similarities of their approach to ours. We also mention how
our system generalizes their system which uses braid groups. See also [8].
We define braid group as a finitely presented group, though there are fancy
pictorial ways to look at braids and multiplication of braids. An interested
reader can look in [4, 10]. The braid group Bn with n-strands is defined as:
Bn = 〈σ1, . . . , σn−1 : σiσjσi = σjσiσj if |i− j| = 1, σiσj = σjσi if |i− j| ≥ 2〉
In [25], the authors found two subgroups A and B of the group of inner
automorphisms of Bn, Inn(Bn), such that, if φ ∈ A and ψ ∈ B, then
φ(ψ(g)) = ψ(φ(g)) for g ∈ Bn. Then the key exchange proceeds similar to
the Key Exchange Protocol I above; with the restriction that Alice chooses
automorphisms from A and Bob chooses automorphisms from B. There is
also a different approach to key exchange using braid groups as in [2, 3].
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In the same spirit as [25] we can develop a key exchange protocol similar
to the key exchange protocol I, where we take two subgroups A and B in
Aut(G) such that for φ ∈ A and ψ ∈ B, φ(ψ(g)) = ψ(φ(g)) for all g ∈ G.
The use of inner automorphisms is only possible when the conjugacy or the
generalized conjugacy problem (conjugator search problem) is known to be
hard.
There are significant differences in our approach to that of the approach
in [25]. In [25], the authors choose a group and then try to use that group
in cryptography. On the other hand, we take the fundamental concept as
the discrete logarithm problem, generalize it using automorphisms of a non-
abelian group and then look for groups favorable to us. The fact that the
central idea in braid group key exchange turns out to be similar to ours is
encouraging.
It is intuitively clear at this point that we should start looking for groups
with abelian automorphism group, i.e., Miller groups.
8. Some useful facts from group theory
The term Miller Group is not that common in the literature. It was
introduced by Earnley in [11]. Miller was the first to study groups with
abelian automorphism group in [34]. Cyclic groups are good examples of
Miller groups. G.A. Miller also proved that no non-cyclic abelian group is
Miller.
Charles Hopkins began a list of necessary conditions for a Miller group
in 1927 [19]. He complained that very little is known about those groups.
The same is true today. Except for some sporadic examples of groups with
abelian automorphism groups, there is no sufficient condition known for a
group to be Miller.
We now state some known facts about Miller groups which are available
in the literature and which we shall need later. For proof of these theorems
which we present in a rapid fire fashion, the reader can look in any standard
text books, like [23, 36], or the references there.
Proposition 8.1. If G is a non-abelian Miller group, then G is nilpotent
and of class 2.
Proof. It follows from the fact that the group of inner automorphisms com-
mute and G/Z(G) ∼= Inn(G). •
Since a nilpotent group is a direct product of its Sylow p-subgroups Sp,
and Aut(A × B) = Aut(A) × Aut(B) whenever A and B are of relatively
prime order, it is enough to study Miller p-groups for prime p.
Proposition 8.2. If G is a p-group of class 2, then exp(G′) = exp(G/Z(G)).
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Proposition 8.3. In a p-group of class 2, (xy)n = xnyn[y, x]
n(n−1)
2 . Fur-
thermore if exp(G′) = n is odd, then (xy)n = xnyn.
By definition, in a Miller group all automorphisms commute. Since central
automorphisms are the centralizer of the group of inner automorphisms, we
have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 8.4. In a Miller group G, all automorphisms are central.
It follows that to show a group is not Miller, all we have to do is to
produce a non-central automorphism.
Proposition 8.5. If the commutator and the center coincide then every
pair of central automorphisms commute.
Proof. Let G be a group such that G′ = Z(G). Then let φ and ψ be
central automorphisms given by φ(x) = xzφ,x and ψ(x) = xzψ,x where
zφ,x, zψ,x ∈ G
′. Then
ψ(φ(x)) = ψ(xzφ,x) = ψ(x)zφ,x = xzψ,xzφ,x = xzφ,xzψ,x = φ(ψ(x)).
•
Definition (Purely non-abelian group). A group G is said to be a purely
non-abelian group (PN group for short) if whenever G = A × B where A
and B are subgroups of G with A abelian, then A = 1. Equivalently G has
no non-trivial abelian direct factor.
Let σ : G → G be a central automorphism. Then we define a map
fσ : G → Z(G) as follows: fσ(g) = g
−1σ(g). Clearly this map defines a
homomorphism. The map σ 7→ fσ is clearly a one-one map. Conversely, if
f ∈ Hom(G,Z(G)) then we define a map σf (g) = gf(g), x ∈ G. Clearly σf
is an endomorphism. It is easy to see that
Ker(σf ) = {x ∈ G : f(x) = x
−1}.
Hence it follows that σf is an automorphism if and only if f(x) 6= x
−1 for
all x ∈ G with x 6= 1.
Theorem 8.6. In a purely non-abelian group G, the correspondence σ → fσ
is a one-one map of Autc(G) onto Hom(G,Z(G))
Proof. See [1]. •
For any f ∈ Hom(G,Z(G)) there is a map f ′ ∈ Hom(G/G′, Z(G)) since
f(G′) = 1. Furthermore, corresponding to f ′ ∈ Hom(G/G′, Z(G)) there is
a map f : G→ Z(G) explained in the following diagram
G
η
−−−−→ G/G′
f ′
−−−−→ Z(G)
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where η is the natural epimorphism.
Let G be a p-group of class 2, such that exp(Z(G)) = a, exp(G′) = b and
exp(G/G′) = c and let d = min(a, c). Now from the fundamental theorem
of abelian groups, let
G/G′ = A1 ⊕A2 ⊕ . . . Ar where Ai = 〈ai〉
Z(G) = B1 ⊕B2 ⊕ . . . Bs where Bi = 〈bi〉
r, s ∈ N be the direct decomposition of G/G′ and Z(G). If the cyclic compo-
nent Ak = 〈ak〉 has exponent greater or equal to the exponent of Bj = 〈bj〉,
then one can define a homomorphisms f : G/G′ → Z(G) as follows
f(ai) =
{
bj where i = k
1 where i 6= k
From this discussion it is clear that for f ∈ Hom(G,Z(G)), f(G) generates
the subgroup
R = {z ∈ Z(G) : |z| ≤ pd, d = min(a, c)}.
Definition (Height). In any abelian p-group A written additively, there is
a descending sequence of subgroups
A ⊃ pA ⊃ p2A ⊃ . . . ⊃ pnA ⊃ pn+1A ⊃ . . .
Then x ∈ A is of height n if x ∈ pnA but not in pn+1A. In other words the
elements of height n are those that drop out of the chain in the (n + 1)th
inclusion.
For further information on height see [22].
Since for a class 2 group we have
exp(G/G′) ≥ exp(G/Z(G)) = exp(G′)
it follows that c ≥ b. Hence if d = min(a, c) then either d = b or d > b.
Let height(xG′) ≥ b, then xG′ = yp
b
G′ for some y ∈ G. Then for any
F ∈ Hom(G,G′), F (yG′)p
b
= 1 implying xG′ ∈ F−1(1). Conversely, let
height(xG′) < b. Then from the previous discussion it is clear that there
is a F ′ ∈ Hom(G/G′, G′) such that xG′ is not in the kernel, consequently
there is a F ∈ Hom(G,G′) such that x /∈ ker(F ). Combining these two facts
we see that:
K =
⋂
F∈Hom(G,G′)
F−1(1) =
{
x ∈ G : height(xG′) ≥ b
}
Proposition 8.7. K ⊆ R
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Proof. In a class 2 group, if x ∈ K then xG′ = yp
b
G′ for some y ∈ G and
exp(G/Z) = b and G′ ⊆ Z(G), hence x ∈ Z(G).
Let x ∈ K, then height(xG′) ≥ b, hence there is a y ∈ G such that
yp
b
G′ = xG′ i.e., x = yp
b
z where z ∈ G′ and yp
c
∈ G′ and c ≥ b. We have
xp
c
= (yp
b
)p
c
zp
c
= (yp
c
)p
b
= 1
Hence |x| ≤ min(pa, pc) which implies that x ∈ R. •
Proposition 8.8. For a PN group G of class 2, if Autc(G) is abelian then
R ⊆ K.
Proof. In a PN group, using Theorem 8.6 and the notation there, two central
automorphisms σ and τ commute if and only if fσ, fτ ∈ Hom(G,Z(G))
commute. Then for any f ∈ Hom(G,Z(G)) and F ∈ Hom(G,G′) we have
that f ◦ F = F ◦ f = 1. Since f(G′) = 1, clearly F ◦ f(G) = 1 proving that
R ⊆ K. •
Combining the above two propositions, we just proved that in a PN group
G of class 2, if Autc(G) is abelian then R = K. As discussed earlier there
are two cases d = b and d > b. Adney and Yen proves that:
Proposition 8.9. If G is a non-abelian p group of class 2, and Autc(G) is
abelian with d > b, then R/G′ is cyclic.
Proof. See [1, Theorem 3]. •
Theorem 8.10 (Adney and Yen). Let G be a purely non-abelian group of
class 2, p odd, let G/G′ =
n∏
i=1
{xiG
′}. Then the group Autc(G) is abelian if
and only if
(i) R = K
(ii) either d = b or d > b and R/G′ = {xp
b
1 G
′}
Proof. See [1, Theorem 4]. •
From the proof of Proposition 8.5 it follows that in a group G with Z(G) ≤
G′, the central automorphisms commute.
Theorem 8.11. The group of central automorphisms of a p-group G, where
p is odd, is a p-group if and only if G has no non-trivial abelian direct factor.
Proof. See [37, Theorem B] and its corollary. •
At this point we concentrate on building a cryptosystem. We note that
Miller groups in particular have no advantage over groups with abelian cen-
tral automorphism group. It is hard to construct Miller groups and there
is no known Miller group for an odd prime, which is not special. So we
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now turn towards a group G such that Aut(G) is not abelian but Autc(G) is
abelian. We propose to use Autc(G) rather than Aut(G) in the key exchange
protocols described earlier.
9. Signature Scheme based on conjugacy problem
Assume that we are working with a group G with commuting inner auto-
morphisms.
Alice publishes α and β where β = a−1αa and keeps a a secret. To sign a
text x ∈ G she picks an arbitrary element k ∈ G and computes γ = kαk−1
and then computes δ such that x = (δk)(aγ)−1. Now notice that
xαx−1 = (δk)(aγ)−1α((δk)(aγ)−1)−1
= (δk)γ−1a−1αaγk−1δ−1
= δγ−1a−1kαk−1aγδ−1 Inner automorphisms commute
= δγ−1a−1γaγδ−1
= δa−1γaδ−1
= δ(kβk−1)δ−1 γ = kαk−1 ⇒ a−1γa = kβk−1
So to sign a message x ∈ G Alice computes δ as mentioned and sends x, (kδ).
To verify the message one computes L = xαx−1 and R = δkβ(δk)−1. If
L = R then the message is authentic otherwise not.
There is a similar signature scheme in [24], where they exploit the gap be-
tween the computational version (conjugacy problem) and the decision ver-
sion of the conjugacy problem (conjugator search problem) in braid groups.
We followed the El-Gamal signature scheme closely [42, Chapter 7].
9.1. Comments on the above Signature Scheme. If one can solve con-
jugacy problem in the group then from the public information α and β he
can find out a and our scheme is broken. Conjugacy problem is known to be
hard in some groups and hence it seems to be a reasonable assumption at
this moment. There is another worry: if Alice sends k and δ separately then
one can find a from the equation x = (δk)(aγ)−1, since γ is computable.
However, this is circumvented easily by sending the product δk not δ and k
individually and keeping k random.
10. An interesting family of p-groups
It is well known that cyclic groups have abelian automorphism groups.
The first person to give an example of a non-abelian group with an abelian
automorphism groups is G.A. Miller in [34] which was generalized by Struik
in [43]. There are three non-abelian groups with abelian automorphism
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group in the Hall-Senior table [16], they are nos. 91, 92 and 99. Miller’s
example is no. 99. In [20], Jamali generalized nos. 91 and 92. His gen-
eralization of no. 91 is in one direction, it increases the exponent of the
group.
Jamali in the same paper generalizes group no. 92 in two directions, the
size of the exponent and the number of generators. His generalization was
restrictive in that it works only for the prime 2. There are other examples
of families of Miller p-groups in the literature, the most notable one is the
family of p-groups, for an arbitrary prime p, given by Jonah and Konisver in
[21]. This was generalized to an arbitrary number of generators by Earnley
in [11]. There are other examples by Martha Morigi in [35] and Heineken and
Liebeck in [18]. All these examples of Miller groups given in [11, 18, 21, 35]
are special groups, i.e., the commutator and the center are the same. For
special groups the key exchange protocols do not work as noted earlier. So
there is no Miller p-group, readily available in the literature, for arbitrary
prime p which can be used right away in construction of the protocol. The
only other source are groups nos. 91, 92 and 99 in the Hall Senior table [16]
and their generalizations, notice that these groups are not special but are 2-
groups. Of the three generalizations, the generalization of no. 92 best fits our
criterion because it is generalized in two directions, viz. number of generators
and exponent of the center and moreover it is not special; Z(G) = A × G′
where A is a cyclic group. So once we generalize it for arbitrary primes,
it has “three degrees of freedom”, the number of generators, exponent of
center and the prime; which makes it attractive for cryptographic purposes.
In the rest of the section we use Jamali’s definition in [20] to define a
family of p-groups for arbitrary prime. So this family is a generalization of
Jamali’s example and assuming transitivity of generalizations, ultimately a
generalization of group no. 92 in the Hall-Senior table [16]. We study au-
tomorphisms of this group and show that the group is Miller if and only if
p = 2, but this family of groups always have an abelian central automor-
phism group which is fairly large. We then attempt to build a key exchange
protocol as described earlier using the central automorphisms. We start
with the definition of the group Gn(m, p).
Definition. Let Gn(m, p) be a group generated by n+ 1 elements
{a0, a1, a2, . . . , an} where p is a prime number and m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 3 are
integers. The group is defined by the following relations:
ap1 = 1, a
pm
2 = 1, a
p2
i = 1 for 3 ≤ i ≤ n, a
p
n−1 = a
p
0.
[a1, a0] = 1, [an, a0] = a1, [ai−1, a0] = a
p
i for 3 ≤ i ≤ n.
[ai, aj ] = 1 for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
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We state some facts about the group Gn(m, p) whose proof is by direct
computation (see [30, Section 2.9]).
a: Gn(m, p)
′ the derived subgroup of Gn(m, p) is an elementary abelian
group 〈a1, a
p
3, . . . a
p
n〉 ≃ Zn−1p .
b: Z(Gn(m, p)) = 〈a
p
2〉 ×G
′.
c: Gn(m, p) is a p-group of class 2.
d: Gn(m, p) is a PN group.
Proposition 10.1. Gn(m, p) is a polycyclic group and every element of g ∈
Gn(m, p) can be uniquely expressed in the form g = a
α0
0 a
α1
1 a
α2
2 a
α3
3 . . . a
αn
n ,
where
0 ≤ αi < p for i = 0, 1; 0 ≤ α2 < p
m, 0 ≤ αi < p
2 for i = 3, 4, . . . , n.
Proof. Define G0 = Gn(m, p) = 〈a0, a1, a2, . . . , an〉, G1 = 〈a1, a2, . . . an〉 and
similarly Gk = 〈ak, ak+1, . . . , an〉 for k ≤ n. Since G1 is a finitely generated
abelian group, it is a polycyclic group [41, Proposition 3.2]. It is fairly
straightforward to show that
G1 ⊲ G2 ⊲ . . . ⊲ Gn ⊲ 〈1〉
is a polycyclic series and {a1, . . . , an} a polycyclic generating sequence of
G1.
It is easy to see from the relations of the group that G1 is normal in
G0 and G0/G1 is cyclic. It is also straightforward to show that 〈aiGi+1〉 =
Gi/Gi+1 and |aiGi+1| = |ai| and hence any element of the group has a unique
representation of the above form. We would call an element represented in
the above form a collected word. See also [41, Chapter 9, Proposition 4.1]. •
Computation with Gn(m, p): Our group Gn(m, p) is of class 2, i.e., com-
mutators of weight 3 are identity, computations become real nice and easy.
Let us demonstrate the product of two collected words g = aα00 a
α1
1 a
α2
2 a
α3
3 a
α4
4
and h = aβ00 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 a
β3
3 a
β4
4 . To compute gh we use concatenation and form the
word aα00 a
α1
1 a
α2
2 a
α3
3 a
α4
4 a
β0
0 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 a
β3
3 a
β4
4 and note that ai’s commute except
for a0 hence one tries to move a0 towards the left using the identity
aia0 = a0ai[ai, a0] =
{
a0aia
p
i+1 for 1 ≤ i < n
a0aia1 for i = n.
Further note, since commutators are in the center of the group, api+1 or a1
can be moved anywhere. Once a0 is moved to the extreme left the word
formed is the collected word of gh. This process is often referred to in the
literature as collection. Computing the inverse of an element can be similarly
done.
We now prove that the group of central automorphisms of the group
Gn(m, p) for an arbitrary prime p is abelian. For sake of simplicity we
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denote Gn(m, p) by G for the rest of the article, and use notations from
Theorem 8.10.
Lemma 10.2. In G, R = Z(G) = K.
Proof. Using the notation from Theorem 8.10, we see that in G, a = m− 1,
b = 1 and c = m hence d = m− 1. Clearly, R = Z(G) hence K ⊆ Z(G).
Let x ∈ Z(G), if x ∈ G′ then height(xG′) = ∞ and we are done. If not,
then x = z1z2 where z1 ∈ 〈a
p
2〉 and z2 ∈ G
′. Then xG′ = z1G
′ and hence
height(xG′) ≥ 1. •
It is easy to see that R/G′ = Z(G)/G′ = 〈ap2G
′〉 and hence from Theorem
8.10 we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 10.3. Autc(G) is abelian.
10.1. Automorphisms of Gn(m, p). In this section we describe the auto-
morphisms of groups of this kind. The discussion is, in more than one way,
an adaptation of the work of Jamali [20] and generalizes his main theorem.
Lemma 10.4. Let x = aβ00 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 . . . a
βn
n , where βi, i = 0, 1, 2 . . . , n are
integers be an element of G. If p = 2 then β0 is 1 and
• x2 = aβn1 a
2β2
2 a
γ3
3 . . . a
γn−2
n−2 a
γn−1+2
n−1 a
γn
n for p = 2. Where γi = 2(βi−1 +
βi).
• xp = apβ22 a
pβ3
3 . . . a
pβn−2
n−2 a
pβn−1+pβ0
n−1 a
pβn
n for p 6= 2.
Proof. For the case p = 2 we just collect terms and use the relation a2n−1 =
a20.
For p 6= 2 using Proposition 8.3 we have
xp = (aβ00 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 . . . a
βn−1
n−1 a
βn
n )
p
= (aβ00 )
p(aβ11 a
β2
2 . . . a
βn−1
n−1 a
βn
n )
p
= apβ00 a
pβ2
2 a
pβ3
3 . . . a
pβn
n
Using the relation apn−1 = a
p
0 we have
apβ00 a
pβ2
2 a
pβ3
3 . . . a
pβn
n = a
pβ2
2 a
pβ3
3 . . . a
pβn−2
n−2 a
pβn−1+pβ0
n−1 a
pβn
n
•
For the group G we note that H = 〈a1, a2, a3, . . . an〉 is the maximal abelian
normal subgroup of G and is characteristic. It follows that the Hp is also
characteristic. Following [20], we define two decreasing sequences of charac-
teristic subgroups {Ki}
n−1
i=0 such that
K0 = H and Ki/K
p
i−1 = Z(G/K
p
i−1) (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
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and {Li} such that
L0 = H and Li = {h : h ∈ H, h
p ∈ [G,Li−1]} (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
It follows easily that
Ki = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an−i, a
p
n−i+1, . . . , a
p
n〉 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
L1 = 〈a1, v, a3, . . . , an〉
Li = 〈a1, v, a
p
3, . . . , a
p
i+1, ai+2, . . . , an〉 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
where v = ap
m−1
2 . For 3 ≤ i ≤ n we have
Kn−i ∩ Li−2 = 〈a1, v, a
p
3, . . . a
p
i−1, ai, a
p
i+1, . . . a
p
n〉 = 〈v, ai, G
′〉.
Also Kn−2 ∩ L0 = 〈a2, G
′〉.
Since 〈v, ai, G
′〉 and 〈a2, G
′〉 are characteristic, for any θ ∈ Aut(G),
θ(a2) = a
k2
2 z where z ∈ G
′ and k2 ∈ N
θ(ai) = a
ki
i v
riz where z ∈ G′; ki ∈ N; i = 3, 4, . . . , n; 0 ≤ ri < p.
It is clear that not all k2 and ki will make θ an automorphism. To begin
with, if θ is an automorphism then gcd(ki, p) = 1 for all ki, and we may
choose ki, such that 0 < ki < p for i = 3, 4, . . . , n.
Let θ(a0) = a
β0
0 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 . . . a
βn
n . Since θ(a
p
0) = θ(a
p
n−1) = θ(an−1)
p =
a
pkn−1
n−1 , from Lemma 10.4
a
pkn−1
n−1 = a
pβ2
2 a
pβ3
3 . . . a
pβn−2
n−2 a
pβn−1+pβ0
n−1 a
pβn
n for p 6= 2
implying β0+βn−1 ≡ kn−1 mod p, p
m−1|β2 and p|βi for i = 3, 4, . . . , n−2, n.
Hence θ(a0) = a
k0
0 a
βn−1
n−1 v
rz where 0 ≤ r < p. We changed β0 to k0 to
maintain uniformity in notations.
Notice the relation [ai, a0] = a
p
i+1 for i = 2, 3, . . . , n implies that
[θ(ai), θ(a0)] = θ(ai+1)
p = a
pki+1
i+1 .
It follows that [akii , a
k0
0 a
βn−1
n−1 ] = a
pki+1
i+1 which is the same as [a
ki
i , a
k0
0 ] = a
pki+1
i+1 ,
which implies that [ai, a0]
k0ki = a
pki+1
i+1 . Recall that G is a p-group of class
2 and an−1 commutes with ai for i ≥ 2. From these we have a recursive
formula for ki, (also see [30, Theorem 2.9.7]): choose k0 such that 0 < k0 < p
and k2 such that 0 < k2 < p
m and gcd(k2, p) = 1 and then define ki+1 = k0ki
mod p for i = 2, 3, 4, . . . , (n− 1); and k1 = k0kn mod p. In [20, Proposition
2.3] Jamali proves that for p = 2, all automorphisms of G are central. We
have just proved that for p 6= 2 there is a non central automorphism, take
k0 > 1; the following theorem follows from Theorem 8.4.
Theorem 10.5. The group Gn(m, p) is Miller if and only if p = 2.
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10.2. Description of the Central Automorphisms. Notice that G is
a PN group, so there is a one-one correspondence between Autc(G) and
Hom(G,Z(G)). Since it is known from our earlier discussion that Z(G) =
〈ap2〉×G
′, Hom(G,Z(G)) = Hom(G, 〈ap2〉)×Hom(G,G
′). It follows: Autc(G) =
A×B where
A = {σ ∈ Autc(G) : x
−1σ(x) ∈ 〈ap2〉}
B = {σ ∈ Autc(G) : x
−1σ(x) ∈ G′}
Elements of A can be explained in a very nice way. Pick a random integer
k such that k = lp + 1 where 0 ≤ l < pm−1 and a random subset R (could
be empty) of {0, 3, 4, . . . n}, and then an arbitrary automorphism in A is
σ(a1) = a1
σ(a2) = a
k
2
σ(ai) =
{
ai if i 6∈ R
ai
(
ap
m−1
2
)ri
if i ∈ R
(2)
We use indexing in {0, 3, 4, . . . , n} to order R and 0 < ri < p is an integer
corresponding to i ∈ R. Conversely, any element in A can be described this
way. It follows from the definition of A that
|A| = pm−1 × pn−1 = pm+n−2.
The automorphism φ ∈ B is of the form
φ(x) =
{
a1 if x = a1
aiz if x = ai, i ∈ {0, 2, 3, . . . , n}
(3)
where z ∈ G′.
We note that
G
Z(G)
is an abelian group and hence Inn(G) is abelian and
hence Inn(G) ⊆ Autc(G). We further note from the commutator relations
in G that Inn(G) ⊆ B.
10.3. Using these automorphisms in key-exchange protocol I. Let
us briefly recall the key-exchange protocol described before. Alice and Bob
decide on a group G and a non-central element g ∈ G\Z(G) in public. Alice
then chooses an arbitrary automorphism φA and sends Bob φA(g). Similarly
Bob picks an arbitrary automorphism φB and sends Alice φB(g). Since the
automorphisms commute, both of them can compute φA(φB(g)), which is
their private key. The most devastating attack on the system is the one in
which Oscar, looking at g, φA(g) and φB(g), can predict what φA(φB(g))
will look like, i.e., a GDHP attack.
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Definition (Parity condition for elements in G). If g = aβ00 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 a
β3
3 . . . a
βn
n
is an arbitrary element of G, i.e., 0 ≤ β0 < p, 0 ≤ β1 < p, 0 ≤ β2 < p
m
and 0 ≤ βi < p
2 for 3 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the vector v := (β0, β3, β4, . . . , βn)
is called the parity of g. Two elements g and g′ are said to be of the same
parity condition if v = v′ mod p, where v′ is the parity of g′.
Lemma 10.6. If φ : G → G is any central automorphism then g and φ(g)
have the same parity condition for any g ∈ G.
Proof. Notice that an automorphism φ either belongs to A or B or is of the
form φ(g) = gfφ(g)gφ(g) where fφ ∈ Hom(G,Z(G)) and gφ ∈ Hom(G,G
′).
So we might safely ignore elements from A, since they only affect the expo-
nent of a2. Also note that a1 being in the commutator remains fixed under
any central automorphism.
So we need to be concerned with elements of B, from the description of B,
and each commutator is a word in p-powers of the generators and from the
fact that G′ ⊂ Z(G), the lemma follows. •
Now let us understand what an element in A does to an element g ∈ G.
We use notations from Equation 2.
Lemma 10.7. Let g = aβ00 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 a
β3
3 . . . a
βn
n , φ ∈ A and if
φ(g) = a
β′0
0 a
β′1
1 a
β′2
2 a
β′3
3 . . . a
β′n
n then βi = β
′
i for i 6= 2 and
β′2 = kβ2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m.
Proof. Notice that from Equation 2, it is clear that elements of A only
affect the exponent of a2, so β
′
i = βi for i 6= 2 follows trivially. From
the definition of A and simple computation it follows that β′2 = kβ2 +
pm−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m. •
In the key exchange protocol I, we will only use automorphisms from2 A.
As noted earlier there are two kinds of attack, GDLP (the discrete logarithm
problem in automorphisms) and GDHP (the Diffie-Hellman problem in au-
tomorphisms). We have earlier stated that GDLP is equivalent to finding
the automorphism from the action of the automorphism on one element.
It seems that for one to find the automorphism discussed in the previous
lemma, one has to find k, R and ri. Notice that β
′
2 = kβ2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi
mod pm, is a knapsack in β2 and p
m−1. Solving that knapsack is not enough
to compute the image of any element, because R is not known so βi’s are not
known. We shall show in a moment that the security of the key exchange
2In light of Lemma 10.6, we believe that adding automorphisms from B is not going
to add to the security of the system.
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protocol depends on the difficulty of this knapsack, but solving this knap-
sack does not help Oscar to find the automorphism, just partial information
about the automorphism comes out.
Next we show that though it seems to be secure under GDLP, but if the
knapsack is solved then the system is broken by GDHP. This proves that
GDHP is a weaker problem than GDLP in Gn(m, p). Let g = a
β0
0 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 a
β3
3
. . . aβnn , then as discussed before for φ,ψ ∈ Autc(G), with notation from
Equation 2 and ki ∈ N for i = 3, 4, . . . , n:
φ(g) = aβ00 a
β1
1 a
k2β2+pm−1
P
i∈R
riβi
2 a
β3+k3p
3 . . . a
β4+k4p
n (4)
ψ(g) = aβ00 a
β1
1 a
k′2β2+p
m−1
P
i∈R′
r′
i
βi
2 a
β3+k′3p
3 . . . a
β4+k′4p
n (5)
From direct computation it follows that the exponent of a2 in φ(ψ(g)) is
k2
(
k′2β2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R′
r′iβi
)
+ pm−1
∑
i∈R
riβi (6)
where k2 = lp+ 1 and k
′
2 = l
′p+ 1, 0 ≤ l, l′ < pm−1. The exponent of a0, a1
stays the same and the exponent of ai will be βi + (ki + k
′
i)p mod p
2 for
3 ≤ i ≤ n. As mentioned before since we are using only automorphisms
from A, i.e., φ and ψ are in A hence ki = k
′
i = 0 for i = 3, 4, . . . , n.
Notice that g, Equations 4 and 5 are public, so Oscar sees those. Since the
exponents of a0, a1, a3, . . . , an are predictable, the key Alice and Bob want
to establish is the exponent of a2 in φ (ψ(g)), which is given by Equation
6. Since Oscar sees Equations 4 and 5, if he can compute k2 from k2β2 +
pm−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m, then he can compute pm−1
∑
i∈R
riβi and the scheme
is broken. But, k2 = lp+ 1 for some l ∈ [0, p
m−1) hence
k2β2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m
reduces to
β2 + lpβ2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m.
Since β2 is public, Oscar can compute lpβ2+ p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m. Notice
that finding k2 is equivalent to finding l, hence one of the security assump-
tions is that there is no polynomial time algorithm to find l from
lpβ2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m. (7)
Let us write
M = lpβ2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m, (8)
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then
M = lpβ2 mod p
m−1.
Now, if lp < pm−1 and gcd(β2, p) = 1, then one can find lp from the above
equation and the scheme is broken. So the only hope of making a secure
cryptosystem out of key exchange protocol I and the group Gn(m, p) is to
take l = kpm−2 where k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (p−1). In this case, if we set l = lpm−2
and l′ = l′pm−2 in Equation 6, then the key will be
(
1 + lpm−1
)(
(1 + l′pm−1)β2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R′
r′iβi
)
+ pm−1
∑
i∈R
riβi
=
(
1 + lpm−1 + l′pm−1
)
β2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R′
r′iβi + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m
=
((
1 + lpm−1
)
β2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi
)
+ l′pm−1β2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R′
r′iβi mod p
m
Now the information in the last equation is easy to compute from the
public information, Equations 4 and 5; so the Key Exchange Protocol I is
broken for automorphisms from A of Gn(m, p) when gcd(β2, p) = 1.
Now if gcd(p, β2) 6= 1, i.e., β2 = kp
i for some i ∈ [1,m) and 1 ≤ k < p,
then an attack similar to the above breaks the system. The insight behind
these attacks is that any solution to Equation 8 can be thought of as the im-
age of g under an automorphism φ′ ∈ A. We are talking about a solution to
Equation 8, which is easy to find, for which φ′(g) =M and then Shpilrain’s
attack breaks the system.
11. Implementation
There is not much reason left to go into the details of an implementation.
We briefly mention that this cryptosystem can be implemented without any
reference to the group Gn(m, p). Once the element g = a
β0
0 a
β1
1 a
β2
2 . . . a
βn
n is
fixed, Alice can send Bob k2β2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R
riβi mod p
m and similarly Bob
can send Alice k′2β2 + p
m−1
∑
i∈R′
r′iβi mod p
m. Since Alice and Bob know
their own k2,
∑
i∈R
riβi and k
′
2,
∑
i∈R′
r′iβi respectively, they can both compute
the private key or the shared secret. Since the only operation involved in
computing the private key is multiplication and addition mod pm, there can
be a very fast implementation of this cryptosystem.
12. Conclusion
In this paper we studied a key exchange protocol using commuting auto-
morphisms in a non-abelian p-group. Since any nilpotent group is a direct
product of its Sylow subgroups, the study of nilpotent groups can be reduced
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to the study of p-groups. We argued that our study is a generalization of
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and is a generalization of the discrete log
problem. Other public key systems like the El-Gamal cryptosystem which
uses the discrete logarithm problem is adaptable to our methods. This is
the first attempt to generalize the discrete logarithm problem in the way we
did.
We should try to find other groups and try our system in terms of GDLP
and GDHP. As we noted earlier, GDHP is a subproblem of the GDLP, and
we saw in Gn(m, p), GDHP is a much easier problem than GDLP. Our
example was of the form d > b in Theorem 8.10. The next step is to look
at groups where d = b. We note from Theorem 8.11, if a p-group G is a PN
group then Autc(G) is a p-group and since p-groups have nontrivial centers;
one can work in that center with our scheme. In this case we would be
generalizing to arbitrary nilpotentcy class while still working with central
automorphisms.
Lastly we note that, if we were using some representation for this finitely
presented group G, for example, matrix representation of the group over a
finite field Fq; then security of the system in Gn(m, p) becomes the discrete
logarithm problem in a matrix algebra [32, 33]. Since the discrete logarithm
problem in matrices is only as secure as the discrete logarithm problem in
finite fields, there is no known advantage to go for matrix representation,
but there might be other representations of interest.
There is one conjecture that comes out of this work and we end with that.
Conjecture 12.1. If G is a Miller p-group for an odd prime p, then G is
special.
Acknowledgment: The author wishes to thank Fred Richman and Rustam
Stolkin; they read the whole manuscript and made valuable suggestions. The
author is indebted to the referee for his kind comments.
References
[1] A. Adney and T. Yen. Automorphisms of p-group. Illinois Journal of Mathematics,
9:137–143, 1965.
[2] I. Anshel, M. Anshel, B. Fisher, and D. Goldfield. New key agreement protocols
in braid group cryptography. In CT-RSA 2001, number 2020 in Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 1–15. Springer, 2001.
[3] I. Anshel, M. Anshel, and D. Goldfeld. An algebraic method for public-key cryptog-
raphy. Math. Research Letters, 6:287–291, 1999.
[4] J. S. Birman. Braids, Links and Mapping Glass Groups. Number 82 in Annals of
Mathematics Studies. Princeton University Press, 1974.
[5] I. Blake, G. Seroussi, and N. Smart. Eliptic Curves in Cryptography. Number 265
in London Mathematical Society, Lecture Note Series. Cambridge University Press,
1999.
22
[6] I. F. Blake and T. Garefalakis. On the complexity of the Discrete Logarithm and
Diffie-Hellman problems. Journal of Complexity, 20, 2004.
[7] D. Boneh. The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem. In Algorithmic number theory (Port-
land, OR, 1998), number 1423 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 48–63.
Springer, Berlin, 1998.
[8] J. H. Cheon and B. Jun. An polynomial time algoritm for tha braid Diffie-Hellman
conjugacy problem. In Advances in cryptography – CRYPTO 2003, number 2729 in
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 212–225. Springer, Berlin, 2003.
[9] M. Curran. Semidirect product groups with abelian automorphism groups. J. Austral.
Math, Soc., Series A(42):84–91, 1987.
[10] P. Dehornoy. Braid-based cryptogrpahy. Contemporary Mathematics, 360:1–33, 2004.
[11] B. E. Earnley. On finite Groups whose group of automorphisms is abelian. PhD thesis,
Wayne State University, 1975.
[12] T. Elgamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms. Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., 196, Springer, Berlin., pages 10–18, 1985.
[13] T. Fournelle. Elementary abelian p-groups as automorphism group of infinite group.
I. Math. Z., 167:259–270, 1979.
[14] S. Galbraith and V. Rotger. Easy decision Diffie-Hellman groups. LMS Journal of
Computation and Mathematics, 7:201–218, 2004.
[15] The GAP Group. GAP – Groups, Algorithms, and Programming, Version 4.3, 2002.
(http://www.gap-system.org).
[16] M. Hall and J. Senior. The groups of order 2n (n ≤ 6). Macmillan, 1964.
[17] P. Hall. The Edmonton notes on nilpotent groups. Queen Mary college mathematics
notes, Cambridge, 1969.
[18] H. Heineken and H. Liebeck. The occurrence of finite groups in the automorphism
group of nilpotent groups of class 2. Archives of Mathematics, 25:8–16, 1974.
[19] C. Hopkins. Non-abelian groups whose groups of isomorphism are abelian. Ann. of
Math, 29(1-4):508–520, 1927.
[20] A.-R. Jamali. Some new non-abelian 2-groups with abelian automorphism groups.
Journal of Group Theory, 5:53–57, 2002.
[21] D. Jonah and M. Konvisser. Some non-abelian p-groups with abelian automorphism
groups. Archives of Mathematics, 26:131–133, 1975.
[22] I. Kaplansky. Infinite Abelian Groups. The University of Michigan Press, 1969.
[23] E. Khukhro. p-Automorphisms of finite p-groups. Number 246 in London Mathemat-
ical Society, Lecture Note Series. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[24] K. H. Ko, D. H. Choi, M. S. Cho, and J. W. Lee. New signature scheme using
conjugacy problem. http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/168, 2002.
[25] K. H. Ko, S. J. Lee, J. H. Cheon, J. W. Han, J. sung Kang, and C. Park. New public-
key cryptosystem using braid groups. In M. Bellare, editor, Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO 2000, number 1880 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 166–183,
2000.
[26] N. Koblitz. A course in number theory and cryptography. Number 114 in Graduate
Texts in Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, New York, second edition, 1994.
[27] N. Koblitz. Algebraic aspects of cryptography. Number 3 in Algorithms and Compu-
tation in Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1998.
[28] N. Koblitz, A. Menezes, and S. Vanstone. The state of Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 19:173–193, 2000.
[29] A. Kurosh. The Theory of Groups, volume 1 & 2. Chelsea Publishing Company, 1960.
23
[30] A. Mahalanobis. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol, Its Generalization
and Nilpotent Groups. PhD thesis, Florida Atlantic University, August 2005.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/223.
[31] A. Mahalanobis. Abelian groups, homomorphisms and central automorphisms of
nilpotent groups. JP Journal of Algebra, Number Theory and Applications, 7(1):69–
81, 2007.
[32] A. J. Menezes and S. A. Vanstone. A note on cyclic group, finite fields and discrete
logarithm problem. Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Communication and Comput-
ing, 3(1):67–74, 1992.
[33] A. J. Menezes and Y.-H. Wu. The discrete logarithm problem in GL(n, q). Ars Com-
binatoria, 47:23–32, 1997.
[34] G. Miller. A non-abelian group whose group of isomorphism is abelian. Messenger
Math., 43:124–125, 1913.
[35] M. Morigi. On p-groups with abelian automorphism group. The Mathematical Journal
of the University of Padova, 92:47–58, 1994.
[36] J. J. Rotman. An introduction to the theory of groups. Springer-Verlag, 1994.
[37] P. R. Sanders. The central automorphism of a finite group. J. London Math. Soc.,
44:225–228, 1969.
[38] W. Scott. Group Theory. Dover, 1964.
[39] I. E. Shparlinski. Security of polynomial transformations of Diffie-Hellman key. Finite
fields and their applications, 10:123–131, 2004.
[40] V. Shpilrain and G. Zapata. Combinatorial group theory and public key cryptography.
Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Communication and Computing, 17(3-4):291–302,
2006.
[41] C. Sims. Computation with finitely presented groups. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1994.
[42] D. Stinson. Cryptography: Theory and Practice. CRC Press, 2 edition, 2002.
[43] R. R. Struik. Some non-abelian 2-groups with abelian automorphism groups. Archives
of Mathematics, 39:299–302, 1982.
[44] M. I. G. Vasco and I. E. Sharlinski. On the security of Diffie-Hellman bits. In Cryptog-
raphy and computational number theory, Progress in Computer Science and Applied
Logic, pages 257–268. Birkha¨user, Basel, 2001.
[45] M. S. Voloshina. On the holomorph of a discrete group. PhD thesis, University of
Rochester, 2003.
[46] H. Zassenhaus. The theory of groups. Chelsea, New York, 1958.
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Stevens Institute of Technology,
Hoboken, NJ 07030, U.S.A.
E-mail address: amahalan@stevens.edu
24
